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Fuzzy Logic Ideas Can Help in Explaining
Kahneman and Tversky’s Empirical Decision
Weights
Joe Lorkowski and Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, Texas 79968, USA
lorkowski@computer.org, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract—Analyzing how people actually make decisions, the
Nobelist Daniel Kahneman and his co-author Amos Tversky
found out that instead of maximizing the expected gain, people
maximize a weighted gain, with weights determined by the
corresponding probabilities. The corresponding empirical weights
can be explained qualitatively, but quantitatively, these weights
remains largely unexplained. In this paper, we show that with
a surprisingly high accuracy, these weights can be explained by
fuzzy logic ideas.

I.

E MPIRICAL D ECISION W EIGHTS : F ORMULATION OF
THE P ROBLEM

Decisions are important. One of the main objectives of
science and engineering is to help people make decisions. For
example, we try to predict weather, so that people will be able
to dress properly (and take an umbrella if needed), so that if a
hurricane is coming, people can evacuate. We analyze quantum
effects in semi-conductors so that engineers can design better
computer chips. We analyze diseases so that medical doctors
can help select the best treatment, etc.
In complex situations, people need help in making their
decisions. In simple situations, an average person can easily
make a decision. For example, if the weather forecast predicts
rain, one should take an umbrella with him/her, otherwise one
should not.
In more complex situations, however, even when we know
all the possible consequences of each action, it is not easy to
make a decision. For example, in medicine, many treatments
come with side effects: a surgery can sometimes result in
a patient’s death, immune system suppression can result in
a infectious disease, etc. In such situations, it is not easy
to compare different actions, and even skilled experts would
appreciate computer-based help.
To help people make decisions, we need to analyze how
people make decisions. One of the difficulties in designing
computer-based systems which would help people make decisions is that to make such systems successful, we need to know
what exactly people want when they make decisions. Often,
people cannot explain in precise terms why exactly they have
selected this or that alternative.
In such situations, we need to analyze how people actually

make decisions, and then try to come up with formal descriptions which fit the observed behavior.
Experiments start with decision making under full information. To analyze how people make decisions, researchers
start with the simplest situations, in which we have the full
information about the :
•

we know all possible outcomes o1 , . . . , on of all
possible actions;

•

we know the exact value ui (e.g., monetary) of each
outcome oi ; and

•

for each action a and to each outcome i, we know the
probability pi (a) of this outcome.

Seemingly reasonable behavior. The outcome of each action
a is not deterministic. For the same action, we may get different outcomes ui with different probabilities pi (a). However,
usually similar situations are repeated again and again.
If we repeat a similar situation several times, then the
average expected gain of selecting an action a becomes close
to the mathematical expectation of the gain, i.e., to the value
def

u(a) =

n
∑

pi (a) · ui .

i=1

Thus, we expect that a decision maker selects the action
a for which this expected value u(a) is the largest. In the
first crude approximation, this is how people actually make
decisions. But if we want a more precise description of human
behavior, we – somewhat surprisingly – have to modify this
formula.
How people actually make decisions is somewhat different.
In their famous experiments, the Nobelist Daniel Kahneman
and his co-author Amos Tversky found out that a much more
accurate description of human decision making can be obtained
if we assume that, instead of maximizing the expected gain,
people maximize a weighted gain, with weights determined by
the corresponding probabilities; see, e.g., [1] and references
therein.

In other words, people select the action a for which the
weighted gain
∑
def
w(a) =
wi (a) · ui
i

attains the largest possible value, where wi (a) = f (pi (a)) for
an appropriate function f (x).
This empirical transformation f (x) from probabilities to
weights takes the following form:
probability
weight
probability
weight

0
0

1
5.5
80
60.1

2
8.1

5
13.2

10
18.6

20
26.1

50
42.1

90
71.2

95
79.3

98
87.1

99
91.2

100
100

How can we explain this empirical transformation? There
are qualitative explanations for this phenomenon, but not the
quantitative one.
In this paper, we propose a quantitative explanation based
on the fuzzy logic ideas.
II.

F UZZY-M OTIVATED I DEA : C ONSIDERING
“D ISTINGUISHABLE ” P ROBABILITIES

Main idea. The main idea behind our explanation is based on
the fact that when people make decisions, they do not estimate
probabilities as numbers from the interval [0, 1] and do not
process them. If a person is asked about the probability of
a certain event, in many cases, the answer will not come as
an exact number, it will most probably come as an imprecise
(“fuzzy”) word, like “low”, “high”, “medium”, etc.; see, e.g.,
[2], [4], [6].
In other words, instead of using all infinitely many possible
real numbers from the interval [0, 1], we only use finitely many
possible values – i.e., in effect, we estimate the probability on a
finite scale. The reason for this discretization is that if the two
probability values are close to each other, intuitively, we do
not feel the difference. For example, there is a clear different
between 10% chances of rain or 50% chances of rain, but
we do not think that anyone can feel the difference between
50% and 51% chances. So, the discrete scale is formed by
probabilities which are distinguishable from each other. Let us
show how this idea can be formalized.
Comment. In this formalization, we will follow ideas first
outlined in [3].
How to formalize when probabilities are distinguishable.
Probability of an event is estimated, from observations, as the
frequency with which this event occurs. For example, if out
of 100 days of observation, rain occurred in 40 of these days,
then we estimate the probability of rain as 40%. In general, if
out of n observations, the event was observed in m of them,
we estimate the probability as the ratio
m
.
n
This ratio is, in general, different from the actual (unknown) probability. For example, if we take a fair coin, for

which the probability of head is exactly 50%, and flip it 100
times, we may get 50 heads, but we may also get 47 heads,
52 heads, etc.
It is known (see, e.g., [5]), that the expected value of the
frequency is equal to p, and that the standard deviation of this
frequency is equal to
√
p · (1 − p)
σ=
.
n
It is also known that, due to the Central Limit Theorem,
for large n, the distribution of frequency is very close to
the normal distribution (with the corresponding mean p and
standard deviation σ).
For normal distribution, we know that with a high certainty
all the values are located within 2-3 standard deviations from
the mean, i.e., in our case, within the interval
(p − k0 · σ, p + k0 · σ),
where k0 = 2 or k0 = 3: for example, for k0 = 3, this is true
with confidence 99.9%. We can thus say that the two values
of probability p and p′ are (definitely) distinguishable if the
corresponding intervals of possible values of frequency do not
intersect – and thus, we can distinguish between these two
probabilities just by observing the corresponding frequencies.
In precise terms, the probabilities p < p′ are distinguishable if
(p − k0 · σ, p + k0 · σ) ∩ (p′ − k0 · σ ′ , p + k0 · σ ′ ) = ∅,
√

where

p′ · (1 − p′ )
,
n
i.e., if p′ − k0 · σ ′ ≥ p + k0 · σ. The smaller p′ , the smaller the
difference p′ − k0 · σ. Thus, for a given probability p, the next
distinguishable value p′ is the one for which
′ def

σ =

p′ − k0 · σ ′ = p + k0 · σ.
When n is large, these value p and p′ are close to each
other; therefore, σ ′ ≈ σ. Substituting an approximate value σ
instead of σ ′ into the above equality, we conclude that
p′ ≈ p + 2k0 · σ = p + 2k0 ·

p · (1 − p)
.
n

If the value p corresponds to the i-th level out of m – i.e.,
in fuzzy terms, corresponds to the truth value
i
m
– then the next value p′ corresponds to the (i + 1)-st level, i.e.,
to the truth value
i+1
.
m
Let g(p) denote the fuzzy truth value corresponding to the
probability p. Then,
i
i+1
and g(p′ ) =
.
m
m
Since the values p and p′ are close, the difference p′ − p is
small, and therefore, we can expand the expression g(p′ ) =
g(p) =

g(p + (p′ − p)) in Taylor series and keep only linear terms in
this expansion: g(p′ ) ≈ g(p) + (p′ − p) · g ′ (p), where
g ′ (p) =

Description of the resulting discretization. For a scale from
0 to some number m, the value g(m) is equal to the ratio
i
.
m

dg
dp

denotes the derivative of the function g(p). Thus,

So, i = mġ(p).

1
= (p′ − p) · g ′ (p).
m
Substituting the known expression for p′ − p into this formula,
we conclude that
√
p · (1 − p) ′
1
= 2k0 ·
· g (p).
m
n
This can be rewritten as
√
g ′ (p) · p · (1 − p) = const

Thus, the desired discretization means that to each probability p, we assign the value i ≈ m · g(p) on the scale from 0
to m, where g(p) is described by the above formula.

g(p′ ) − g(p) =

for some constant, and thus,
1
.
g ′ (p) = const · √
p · (1 − p)
Integrating this expression and taking into account that p = 0
corresponds to the lowest 0-th level – i.e., that g(0) = 0 – we
conclude that
∫ p
dq
√
g(p) = const ·
.
q · (1 − q)
0
This integral can be easily computed if introduce a new
variable t for which q = sin2 (t). In this case,
dq = 2 · sin(t) · cos(t) · dt,
1 − p = 1 − sin2 (t) = cos2 (t) and therefore,
√
√
p · (1 − p) = sin2 (t) · cos2 (t) = sin(t) · cos(t).
The lower bound q = 0 corresponds to t = 0 and the upper
bound q = p corresponds
to the value t0(√
for )which sin2 (t0 ) =
√
p – i.e., sin(t0 ) = p and t0 = arcsin p . Therefore,
∫ p
dq
√
g(p) = const ·
=
q · (1 − q)
0
∫ t0
∫ t0
2 · sin(t) · cos(t) · dt
const ·
=
2 · dt =
sin(t) · cos(t)
0
0
2 · const · t0 .
We know how t0 depends on p, so we get
√
g(p) = 2 · const · arcsin ( p ) .
We can determine the constant from the condition that the
largest possible probability value p = 1 should correspond
to the right-most point g(p) = 1. From the condition that
g(1) = 1, taking into account that
(√ )
π
1 = arcsin(1) = ,
arcsin
2
we conclude that
2
√
(1)
g(p) = · arcsin ( p ) .
π

III.

D ISTINGUISHABLE P ROBABILITIES C AN E XPLAIN
E MPIRICAL D ECISION W EIGHTS

How do we select weights? If we need to select finitely many
weights from the interval [0, 1], then it is natural to select
weights which are equally distributed on this interval, i.e.,
weights
m−1
1 2
, 1.
(2)
0, , , . . . ,
m m
m

How to assign weights to probabilities: idea. We have m a
finite list of distinguishable probabilities 0 = p0 < p1 < . . . <
pm = 1. These probabilities correspond to degree
i
,
(3)
m
where g(p) is determined by the formula (1). We need to
assign, to each of these probabilities, an appropriate weight
from the above list (2).
g(pi ) =

The larger the probability, the more weight we should
assign to the corresponding outcome. Thus, we arrive at the
following assignment of weights to probabilities:
•

to the value p0 = 0, we assign the smallest possible
weight w0 = 0;

•

to the next value p1 , we assign the next weight

•

1
;
m
to the next value p2 , we assign the next weight
w1 =

w1 =

1
;
m

•

...

•

to the value pm−1 , we assign the weight
m−1
;
m
= 1, we assign the weight

wm−1 =
•

finally, to the value pm

wm = 1.
In general, to the value pi , we assign the weight
wi =

i
.
m

By comparing this assignment with the formula (3), we
conclude that to each value pi , we assign the value wi = g(pi ).

How to assign weights to probabilities: result. Our arguments show that to each probability p ∈ [0, 1], we assign the
weight g(p), where the function g(p) is determined by the
formula (1).
Comparing our weights with empirical weights: first try.
Let us compare the probabilities pi , Kahneman’s empirical
weights w
ei , and the weight wi = g(pi ) computed by using
the formula (1):
pi
w
ei
wi = g(pi )
pi
w
ei
wi = g(pi )

0
0
0

1
5.5
6.4
80
60.1
70.5

2
8.1
9.0

5
13.2
14.4

10
18.6
20.5

20
26.1
29.5

50
42.1
50.0

90
71.2
79.5

95
79.3
85.6

98
87.1
91.0

99
91.2
93.6

100
100
100

The estimates wi = g(pi ) are closer to the observed
weights w
ei than the original probabilities, but the relation does
not seem very impressive.
We will show that the fit is much better than it seems
at first glance. At first glance, the above direct comparison
between the observed weights w
ei and the estimated weights
wi = g(pi ) seems to make perfect sense. However, let us look
deeper.
The weights come ∑
from the fact that users maximize the
weighted gain w(a) = wi (a) · ui . It is easy to observe that
if we multiply all the weights by the same positive constant
λ > 0, i.e., consider the weights wi′ (a) = λ · wi (a), then for
each action, the resulting value of the weighted gain will also
increase by the same factor:
∑
∑
λ · wi (a) · ui =
w′ (a) =
wi′ (a) · ui =
∑
λ·
wi (a) · ui = λ · wi (a).
The relation between the weighted gains of two actions a
and a′ does not change if we simply multiply both gains by a
positive constant:
•

if wi (a) < wi (a′ ), then, multiplying both sides of this
inequality by λ, we get wi′ (a) < wi′ (a′ );

•

if wi (a) = wi (a′ ), then, multiplying both sides of this
equality by λ, we get wi′ (a) = wi′ (a′ );

•

if wi (a) > wi (a′ ), then, multiplying both sides of this
inequality by λ, we get wi′ (a) > wi′ (a′ ).

All we observe if which of the two actions a person selects.
Since multiplying all the weights by a constant does not change
the selection, this means that based on the selection, we cannot
uniquely determine the weights: an empirical selection which
is consistent with the weights wi is equally consistent with the
weights wi′ = λ · wi .
This fact can be use to normalize the empirical weights, i.e.,
to multiply them by a constant so as to satisfy some additional
condition.

In [1], to normalize the weights, the authors use the
requirement that the weight corresponding to probability 1
should be equal to 1. Since for p = 1, the estimated weight
g(1) is also equal to 1, we get a perfect match for p = 1 – but
a rather lousy march for probabilities intermediate between 0
and 1.
Instead of this normalization, we can select λ so as to get
the best match “on average”.
How to improve the fit: details. A natural idea is to select
λ from the Least Squares method, i.e., select λ for which the
relative mean squares difference
)2
∑ ( λ · wi − w
ei
wi

i

is the smallest possible. Differentiating this expression with
respect to λ and equating the derivative to 0, we conclude that
)
∑(
w
ei
λ−
= 0,
wi
i
i.e., that
λ=

1 ∑w
ei
·
.
m i wi

Resulting match. For the above values, this formula leads to
λ = 0.910.
The resulting values wi′ = λ · wi are indeed much closer
to the empirical weights x
ei :

pi
w
ei
wi′ = λ · g(pi )

0
0
0

pi
w
ei
wi′ = λ · g(pi )

80
60.1
64.2

1
5.5
5.8

2
8.1
8.2
90
71.2
72.3

5
13.2
13.1
95
79.3
77.9

10
18.6
18.7
98
87.1
82.8

20
26.1
26.8
99
91.2
87.4

50
42.1
45.5
100
100
91.0

For most probabilities pi , the difference between the fuzzymotivated weights wi′ and the empirical weights w
ei is so small
that it is below the accuracy with which the empirical weights
can be obtained from the experiment.
Conclusion. Fuzzy-motivated ideas indeed explain Kahneman
and Tversky’s empirical decision weights.
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